TY - BOOK AU - Roger Guesnerie TI - A Contribution to the Pure theory of Taxation SN - 9780521629560 AV - HJ2305.G84 PY - 1998/// CY - Cambridge PB - Cambridge University Press KW - Taxation N1 - includes index; Introduction: -- 1. An overview of chapter 1: the institutional economics of taxation -- 2. A presentation of the model -- 3. An overview of chapter 2: positive economics -- 4. An overview of chapter 3: normative economics of taxation -- 5. An overview of chapter 4: normative economics of taxation: further issues -- 6. An overview of Chapter 5: the political economics of taxation -- 1. Institutional economics of taxation: 1.1. Introduction -- 1.2. The model -- 1.3. Allocation via game forms -- 1.4. Tax systems versus game forms -- 1.5. More on game forms versus tax systems -- 1.6. Coming back on the anonymity assumption -- 1.7. Conclusion -- 1.8. Bibliographical note -- 2. Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria -- 2.1. The basic model -- 2.2. The local structure of the set of tax equilibria -- 2.3. The global structure of the set of tax equilibria -- 2.4. Positive economics: tax equilibrium and tax incidence -- 2.5. Bibliographical note -- 3. Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization -- 3.1. Tax reform, the canonical argument -- 3.2. Tax reform: a closer examination of specific situations -- 3.3. Tax reform: from infinitesimal to finite changes-algorithms of tax reform -- 3.4. Tax reform -- further discussions -- 3.5. Second-best Pareto optima -- 3.6. Bibliographical note -- 4. Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform -- 4.1. The social values of commodities -- 4.2. Non-linearities and quotas policies -- 4.3. Optimal taxes and tax reform in a one-consumer economy -- 4.4. Mixing linear and non-linear taxation a bird's eye view -- 4.5. Bibliographical note -- 5. Political economics of taxation -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. The structure of the set of Pareto optimal tax equilibria -- 5.3. Taxation as a social choice or a game theoretical problem -- 5.4. A one-dimensional version of the taxation game -- 5.5. Further remarks on the one-dimensional taxation game -- 5.6. Bibliographical note ER -