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  <titleInfo>
    <title>A Contribution to the Pure theory of Taxation</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Roger Guesnerie</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Cambridge</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher>
    <dateIssued>1998</dateIssued>
    <edition>1st ed</edition>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>xv, 299 pages  illustrations ; 24 cm</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <tableOfContents>Introduction: --
1. An overview of chapter 1: the institutional economics of taxation --
2. A presentation of the model --
3. An overview of chapter 2: positive economics --
4. An overview of chapter 3: normative economics of taxation --
5. An overview of chapter 4: normative economics of taxation: further issues --
6. An overview of Chapter 5: the political economics of taxation --
1. Institutional economics of taxation: 1.1. Introduction --
1.2. The model --
1.3. Allocation via game forms --
1.4. Tax systems versus game forms --
1.5. More on game forms versus tax systems --
1.6. Coming back on the anonymity assumption --
1.7. Conclusion --
1.8. Bibliographical note --
2. Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria --
2.1. The basic model --
2.2. The local structure of the set of tax equilibria --
2.3. The global structure of the set of tax equilibria --
2.4. Positive economics: tax equilibrium and tax incidence --
2.5. Bibliographical note --
3. Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization --
3.1. Tax reform, the canonical argument --
3.2. Tax reform: a closer examination of specific situations --
3.3. Tax reform: from infinitesimal to finite changes-algorithms of tax reform --
3.4. Tax reform --
further discussions --
3.5. Second-best Pareto optima --
3.6. Bibliographical note --
4. Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform --
4.1. The social values of commodities --
4.2. Non-linearities and quotas policies --
4.3. Optimal taxes and tax reform in a one-consumer economy --
4.4. Mixing linear and non-linear taxation a bird's eye view --
4.5. Bibliographical note --
5. Political economics of taxation --
5.1. Introduction --
5.2. The structure of the set of Pareto optimal tax equilibria --
5.3. Taxation as a social choice or a game theoretical problem --
5.4. A one-dimensional version of the taxation game --
5.5. Further remarks on the one-dimensional taxation game --
5.6. Bibliographical note.</tableOfContents>
  <note type="statement of responsibility">Roger Guesnerie</note>
  <note>includes index</note>
  <subject>
    <topic>Taxation</topic>
  </subject>
  <classification authority="lcc">HJ2305.G84</classification>
  <identifier type="isbn">9780521629560</identifier>
  <recordInfo/>
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