Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

Lectures in industrial organization theory / Kaushik Basu.

By: Material type: TextPublication details: Oxford, UK ; Cambridge, USA : Blackwell, 1993.Description: x, 236 p. : ill. ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 1557863431 (pbk. : acidfree paper)
Subject(s): LOC classification:
  • HD2326 .B373
Contents:
1. Introduction -- 1.1. Origins -- 1.2. Prospectus -- 2. Game Theory: Normal-Form Games -- 2.2. Nash equilibrium -- 2.3. A refinement of Nash: perfection -- 2.4. A coarsening of Nash: rationalizability -- 3. The Standard Market Structures -- 3.2. Monopoly -- 3.3. Competition -- 3.4. Oligopoly -- 3.5. Dominant firms and fringes -- 4. Oligopoly and Some Non-Cournot Equilibria -- 4.2. Rationalizability and oligopoly -- 4.3. Bertrand equilibrium and the Edgeworth indeterminacy -- 5. Nonlinear Pricing -- 5.2. Two-part tariffs -- 5.3. Monopoly and efficiency -- 5.4. Nonlinear pricing -- 5.5. Tie-ins, clusters and interlinkage -- 6. Quality -- 6.2. Quality hierarchies -- 6.3. Strategic substitutes and complements -- 6.4. Quality, status and market disequilibria -- 7. Durability -- 7.2. Durability under monopoly and competition -- 7.3. Durable goods: renting and selling -- 8. Location, Brands and Advertising -- 8.2. Location -- 8.3. Brand proliferation -- 8.4. Advertising -- 9. Game Theory: Extensive-Form Games -- 9.2. The idea of perfection in extensive games -- 9.3. Repeated games and trigger strategies -- 9.4. Simple strategy profiles -- 9.5. Critiques, refinements and extensions -- 10. Oligopoly in the Extensive Form: Two Examples -- 10.2. The two fishermen -- 10.3. Towards collusion -- 11. Quantities and Prices -- 11.2. First quantity, then price -- 11.3. Quick-response oligopoly -- 11.4. Supply functions equilibria -- 12. Collusion -- 12.2. Some legal issues -- 12.3. Infinitely repeated oligopoly -- 12.4. Finitely repeated oligopoly -- 12.5. Extensions -- 13. Entry Deterrence -- 13.2. Capacity, investment and deterrence -- 13.3. Chain stores and reputations -- 13.4. Sequential entry -- 14. Managerial Incentives -- 14.2. The incentive equilibrium -- 14.3. Extensions and critiques -- 15. Switching Costs -- 15.2. A formal model -- 15.3. Switching costs and rural credit -- 15.4. Captive segment conditions and profit -- 16. Government Intervention -- 16.2. Mixed oligopoly -- 16.3. Partly state-owned firms and entry barriers -- 16.4. Pigouvian interventions -- 16.5. The state and the law: some open issues.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Holdings
Cover image Item type Current library Home library Collection Shelving location Call number Materials specified Vol info URL Copy number Status Notes Date due Barcode Item holds Item hold queue priority Course reserves
Books Methodist University Library Main General Stacks Reference HD2326 .B373 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 11279

Includes bibliographical references and index

1. Introduction --
1.1. Origins --
1.2. Prospectus --
2. Game Theory: Normal-Form Games --
2.2. Nash equilibrium --
2.3. A refinement of Nash: perfection --
2.4. A coarsening of Nash: rationalizability --
3. The Standard Market Structures --
3.2. Monopoly --
3.3. Competition --
3.4. Oligopoly --
3.5. Dominant firms and fringes --
4. Oligopoly and Some Non-Cournot Equilibria --
4.2. Rationalizability and oligopoly --
4.3. Bertrand equilibrium and the Edgeworth indeterminacy --
5. Nonlinear Pricing --
5.2. Two-part tariffs --
5.3. Monopoly and efficiency --
5.4. Nonlinear pricing --
5.5. Tie-ins, clusters and interlinkage --
6. Quality --
6.2. Quality hierarchies --
6.3. Strategic substitutes and complements --
6.4. Quality, status and market disequilibria --
7. Durability --
7.2. Durability under monopoly and competition --
7.3. Durable goods: renting and selling --
8. Location, Brands and Advertising --
8.2. Location --
8.3. Brand proliferation --
8.4. Advertising --
9. Game Theory: Extensive-Form Games --
9.2. The idea of perfection in extensive games --
9.3. Repeated games and trigger strategies --
9.4. Simple strategy profiles --
9.5. Critiques, refinements and extensions --
10. Oligopoly in the Extensive Form: Two Examples --
10.2. The two fishermen --
10.3. Towards collusion --
11. Quantities and Prices --
11.2. First quantity, then price --
11.3. Quick-response oligopoly --
11.4. Supply functions equilibria --
12. Collusion --
12.2. Some legal issues --
12.3. Infinitely repeated oligopoly --
12.4. Finitely repeated oligopoly --
12.5. Extensions --
13. Entry Deterrence --
13.2. Capacity, investment and deterrence --
13.3. Chain stores and reputations --
13.4. Sequential entry --
14. Managerial Incentives --
14.2. The incentive equilibrium --
14.3. Extensions and critiques --
15. Switching Costs --
15.2. A formal model --
15.3. Switching costs and rural credit --
15.4. Captive segment conditions and profit --
16. Government Intervention --
16.2. Mixed oligopoly --
16.3. Partly state-owned firms and entry barriers --
16.4. Pigouvian interventions --
16.5. The state and the law: some open issues.

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.
Share
Copyright © 2026  MUG Library