A Contribution to the Pure theory of Taxation
Roger Guesnerie
A Contribution to the Pure theory of Taxation Roger Guesnerie - 1st ed - Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998 - xv, 299 pages illustrations ; 24 cm
includes index
Introduction: --
1. An overview of chapter 1: the institutional economics of taxation --
2. A presentation of the model --
3. An overview of chapter 2: positive economics --
4. An overview of chapter 3: normative economics of taxation --
5. An overview of chapter 4: normative economics of taxation: further issues --
6. An overview of Chapter 5: the political economics of taxation --
1. Institutional economics of taxation: 1.1. Introduction --
1.2. The model --
1.3. Allocation via game forms --
1.4. Tax systems versus game forms --
1.5. More on game forms versus tax systems --
1.6. Coming back on the anonymity assumption --
1.7. Conclusion --
1.8. Bibliographical note --
2. Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria --
2.1. The basic model --
2.2. The local structure of the set of tax equilibria --
2.3. The global structure of the set of tax equilibria --
2.4. Positive economics: tax equilibrium and tax incidence --
2.5. Bibliographical note --
3. Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization --
3.1. Tax reform, the canonical argument --
3.2. Tax reform: a closer examination of specific situations --
3.3. Tax reform: from infinitesimal to finite changes-algorithms of tax reform --
3.4. Tax reform --
further discussions --
3.5. Second-best Pareto optima --
3.6. Bibliographical note --
4. Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform --
4.1. The social values of commodities --
4.2. Non-linearities and quotas policies --
4.3. Optimal taxes and tax reform in a one-consumer economy --
4.4. Mixing linear and non-linear taxation a bird's eye view --
4.5. Bibliographical note --
5. Political economics of taxation --
5.1. Introduction --
5.2. The structure of the set of Pareto optimal tax equilibria --
5.3. Taxation as a social choice or a game theoretical problem --
5.4. A one-dimensional version of the taxation game --
5.5. Further remarks on the one-dimensional taxation game --
5.6. Bibliographical note.
9780521629560
Taxation
HJ2305.G84
A Contribution to the Pure theory of Taxation Roger Guesnerie - 1st ed - Cambridge Cambridge University Press 1998 - xv, 299 pages illustrations ; 24 cm
includes index
Introduction: --
1. An overview of chapter 1: the institutional economics of taxation --
2. A presentation of the model --
3. An overview of chapter 2: positive economics --
4. An overview of chapter 3: normative economics of taxation --
5. An overview of chapter 4: normative economics of taxation: further issues --
6. An overview of Chapter 5: the political economics of taxation --
1. Institutional economics of taxation: 1.1. Introduction --
1.2. The model --
1.3. Allocation via game forms --
1.4. Tax systems versus game forms --
1.5. More on game forms versus tax systems --
1.6. Coming back on the anonymity assumption --
1.7. Conclusion --
1.8. Bibliographical note --
2. Positive economics: the structure of tax equilibria --
2.1. The basic model --
2.2. The local structure of the set of tax equilibria --
2.3. The global structure of the set of tax equilibria --
2.4. Positive economics: tax equilibrium and tax incidence --
2.5. Bibliographical note --
3. Normative economics of taxation: reform and optimization --
3.1. Tax reform, the canonical argument --
3.2. Tax reform: a closer examination of specific situations --
3.3. Tax reform: from infinitesimal to finite changes-algorithms of tax reform --
3.4. Tax reform --
further discussions --
3.5. Second-best Pareto optima --
3.6. Bibliographical note --
4. Normative economics of taxation: further essays on optimization and reform --
4.1. The social values of commodities --
4.2. Non-linearities and quotas policies --
4.3. Optimal taxes and tax reform in a one-consumer economy --
4.4. Mixing linear and non-linear taxation a bird's eye view --
4.5. Bibliographical note --
5. Political economics of taxation --
5.1. Introduction --
5.2. The structure of the set of Pareto optimal tax equilibria --
5.3. Taxation as a social choice or a game theoretical problem --
5.4. A one-dimensional version of the taxation game --
5.5. Further remarks on the one-dimensional taxation game --
5.6. Bibliographical note.
9780521629560
Taxation
HJ2305.G84